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Taxation and Incentives in the Business Enterprise 
By David Gamage1 & Shruti Rana2 
 
I. Introduction 
 Tax law is intimately connected to enterprise law.3  In many legal practices, 
lawyers who serve enterprise clients regularly turn to tax lawyers for advice on 
structuring transactions.  Often, the enterprise lawyers first devise a transaction in order 
to further some business-law related end, and then turn to tax lawyers to insure that the 
transaction is structured in a tax-favorable manner.  In other instances, tax lawyers 
devise transactions in order to minimize an enterprise client’s tax liabilities, and then 
turn to the enterprise lawyers to structure the transaction in accordance with the client’s 
non-tax goals.  Enterprise lawyers and tax lawyers thus need a mutual understanding 
so that they can work together to meet their clients’ tax and non-tax goals.  At a 
minimum, enterprise and tax lawyers need to know when to ask each other for advice 
and when to defer to each other’s expertise.   
 Similarly, anyone interested in the design of enterprise law must engage with 
taxation.  Tax laws significantly impact all of the major incentive bargains analyzed in 
this volume.  The agreements managers reach with employees, shareholders, and 
creditors are all regularly structured with an eye to tax considerations.4   
Tax law potentially offers policymakers a powerful tool for influencing the 
incentive bargains that comprise the business enterprise.5  Even if policymakers do not 
                                            
1 Assistant Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law School.  
2 Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.   
3 See DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES, at v (3d ed. 2011); John Flood & Fabian 
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wish to use tax law as a tool for regulating the business enterprise, tax laws will 
nevertheless remain an important background force that policymakers must take into 
account.  It is impossible to design a completely neutral tax system with respect to 
enterprise law’s incentive bargains; taxation will inevitably impact these bargains, 
whether policymakers wish it to or not.  Consequently, a thorough examination of 
enterprise law requires engaging with tax law and policy. 
  
II. The Tax Policy Perspective 
 To understand why it is impossible to design a tax system that is neutral with 
respect to the incentive bargains that comprise the business enterprise, it is useful to 
begin by evaluating the goals of taxation.  Anyone interested in the design of enterprise 
law must engage with the tax system and hence must understand the tax policy 
perspective on the interactions between taxation and enterprise law. 
 Nevertheless, before proceeding to evaluate the goals of taxation, we should first 
briefly discuss possible underlying models of government behavior.  Much of tax policy 
scholarship adopts what might be called the beneficial dictator model.6  This scholarship 
asks how a government concerned only with public welfare should design tax policy.  
This scholarship thus takes little account of the possibility that government actors may 
be influenced by goals other than promoting the general welfare. 
 In contrast, tax scholarship operating within the public choice tradition frequently 
adopts what might be called the leviathan model of government behavior.7  Under this 
model, governments are assumed to act so as to maximize the government’s power, 
thus usually raising as much tax revenue as the government can get away with.  
Scholars who analyze tax policy based on leviathan models often focus on prescribing 
mechanisms for constraining the power of government actors.  Questions related to 
determining what is the ideal tax system are viewed as less important, because a 
leviathan government would never enact an ideal tax system. 
 Between the extremes of the beneficial dictator and leviathan models, what might 
be called the interest group bargaining model assumes that governments sometimes 
pursue the general welfare and other times attempt to reward narrow interest groups 
                                            
6 See James M. Poterba, Public Finance and Public Choice, in TAX POLICY IN THE REAL WORLD 429- (Joel Slemrod 
ed., 1999) (discussing critiques of the public finance tradition of tax policy scholarship). 
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that can help politicians win reelection.8  As a general rule of thumb, scholars often 
assume that governments are more concerned with broad public opinion and the 
general welfare when issues are highly salient, and that governments are more 
concerned with rewarding narrow interest groups when issues are less salient.9     
 Because our goal is to explain why it is not possible to design a tax system that is 
completely neutral with respect to the incentive bargains that comprise the business 
enterprise, we mostly adopt the beneficial dictator model in this chapter.  Yet we do not 
mean to suggest that real-world governments operate following the beneficial dictator 
model.  In our view, interest group bargaining models offer better predictions of real-
world government behavior than do either the beneficial dictator or leviathan models.  
The beneficial dictator model does not sufficiently take account of the fact that 
politicians in democracies rely on the support of narrow interest groups whose goals do 
not always involve promoting the general welfare.  And the leviathan model ignores that 
democratic governments are composed of many individual politicians facing collective 
action problems, such that even politicians unconcerned with the general welfare often 
have little incentive to prioritize expanding the government’s powers.  For enterprise law 
scholars then, it is important to keep in mind that taxation will often affect enterprise law 
due to rules that governments design for the benefit of particular narrow interest groups 
rather than for the goal of advancing the general welfare through sound tax policy. 
A. The Goal of Minimizing Excess Burden 
 The most important reason why governments enact tax laws is to raise revenues 
for funding government spending.  Yet a central dilemma of tax policy is that taxing any 
activity typically leads taxpayers to engage in less of that activity.10  Hence, for example, 
taxing the income from work incentivizes taxpayers to shift from work to leisure; taxing 
purchased goods incentivizes taxpayers to buy less of the taxed goods; and taxing 
investment returns incentivizes taxpayers to make fewer taxable investments. 
 When taxation induces taxpayers to engage in less of a taxed activity, both the 
individual taxpayers and the government are made worse off.  The taxpayers are made 
worse off because the taxpayers have shifted from a more desired activity – the activity 
the taxpayers would have preferred to engage in were it not for the tax – to a less 
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10 David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX 
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desired activity.  The government is made worse off because the government receives 
no revenue to the extent that taxpayers shift to untaxed activities.  When taxation 
causes taxpayers to shift to untaxed alternative activities then, society as a whole is 
made worse off.  This harm to society that results from tax-induced changes to taxpayer 
behavior is often called “excess burden” or “deadweight loss.”11   
 Consequently, a simple maxim for designing optimal tax policy is that 
governments should focus on taxing “inelastic” activities – activities for which taxpayers 
do not shift their behavior much in response to taxation.  Another simple maxim is that it 
is usually best to make the tax base as comprehensive as possible; the more activities 
that are taxed at the same rate, the fewer options taxpayers have for shifting to untaxed 
or lower taxed alternative activities. 
 Unfortunately, governments find it very difficult to tax capital income – the income 
that taxpayers earn from investments.  Governments that rely significantly on income 
taxes, such as the U.S. and Japan, thus face enormous problems in enacting a 
comprehensive tax base with respect to capital income.12  Exacerbating this problem, 
wealthy taxpayers have developed a number of techniques for transforming the 
monetary compensation they receive from working into a form that is taxed as capital 
income under an income tax rather than as labor income.13  Hence, the difficulties 
governments face in taxing capital income threaten governments’ ability to collect taxes 
from wealthy taxpayers even on their labor income.  And the techniques that taxpayers 
use to minimize their tax liabilities, both with respect to capital income and labor income, 
create significant excess burden beyond the revenue loss to the government.  
  The transactions that wealthy taxpayers use to reduce their capital income tax 
liabilities, and the anti-abuse rules that governments develop in order to combat these 
transactions, have significant impacts on enterprise law.  For instance, the income tax 
laws of both the U.S. and Japan create a significant bias for debt-financing as opposed 
to equity financing.14  Sophisticated taxpayers respond to this bias both by shifting from 
equity financing to debt financing and by creating new hybrid financial instruments that 
maintain some of the economic characteristics of equity while being taxed as debt.  
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12 See generally Alan J. Auerbach, The Future of Captial Income Taxation, INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES ANNUAL 
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13 E.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
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14 E.g., Ruud A. de Mooij, Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions, IMF STAFF 
DISCUSSSION NOTE, May 3, 2011. 
These tax-motivated transactions then significantly impact corporate governance, as 
equity holder and debt holders have different control rights and as enterprise law must 
cope with the control rights granted to the holders of hybrid instruments. 
B. The Goal of Promoting Distribution Policy 
If policymakers cared only about the goal of minimizing excess burden, then 
there would be a simple solution for designing the optimal tax system.  Under a “head 
tax”, each citizen is taxed the exact same fixed amount – an amount that remains 
constant regardless of any activities or behaviors the taxpayers engages in.  Hence, a 
head tax assesses tax liabilities based on an activity that is highly inelastic – being a 
citizen.  The only option taxpayers have for escaping a head tax is to leave the country 
and renounce their citizenship. 
The reason that governments do not exclusively rely on head taxes for raising 
revenues is distribution.15  Even the most conservative of commentators generally agree 
that poorer citizens should not be assessed the same tax liabilities as richer citizens.  
Note in this regard that even a pure “flat tax” is in no way a head tax.  Under a pure flat 
tax, all citizens are assessed tax liabilities based on the same percentage of their 
income or consumption.  Because richer individuals have higher income and 
consumption than poorer individuals, a pure flat tax thus results in richer citizens paying 
far higher tax liabilities than poorer citizens.  And conservative advocates of a flat tax 
rarely call for a pure flat tax.  Instead, most proposals for a flat tax include an exemption 
amount, wherein income or consumption under a specified threshold is exempt from 
tax, thus making flat tax proposals even more progressive by reducing the effective tax 
rates on poorer taxpayers as compared to richer taxpayers.   
A major reason why many support imposing taxes on corporations and large 
business enterprises is based on distribution.  Liberals often argue that the incidence of 
taxes imposed on large business enterprises falls primarily on monetary capital 
providers, who tend to be far wealthier than workers or consumers.16  However, it is not 
at all clear the extent to which the incidence of taxes on large business enterprises 
actually falls on capital; much recent scholarship suggests that workers and consumers 
may bear the majority of the burden of these taxes.17   
                                            
15 We avoid the term “redistribution”, instead using the phrase “distribution policy”, because the term redistribution 
misleadingly implies a state-of-nature baseline prior to government in which taxpayers would control the entirety of 
their pre-tax incomes.  For further discussion on this point, see Gamage & Shanske, supra note 10, at 79-98.  
16 For a discussion of the debate over corporate tax incidence, see Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? 
A Review of What We Know, 20 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1-40 (NBER, 2006). 
17 Id. 
A simple maxim for evaluating tax incidence – who bears the economic burden of 
a tax – evaluates the relative elasticity of the parties that might potentially be subject to 
the tax.18  With respect to corporate taxes and other taxes on large business 
enterprises, the question then becomes the extent to which workers are more able to 
switch jobs if their salaries are lowered, as compared to the extent to which consumers 
are more able to switch to buying alternative products if prices are raised, and as 
compared to the extent to which monetary capital providers are comparatively more 
able to switch their investment choices if the expected returns are lowered.  Taxing 
large business enterprises reduces their profitability, which means that less money will 
be available to pay workers, keep prices low for consumers, and reward monetary 
capital providers.  For distributional considerations, the question is which of these 
groups comparatively bears the greatest burdens from the tax. 
Looking beyond taxes directly imposed on large business enterprises, 
distributional considerations also motivate other tax instruments that significantly affect 
enterprise law’s incentive bargains.  Both the U.S. and Japan have a progressive 
structure to their income taxes, wherein higher-income taxpayers face higher tax rates 
than do lower-income taxpayers.19  The higher marginal income tax rates that high-
income taxpayers face under a progressive income tax impact the compensation 
packages paid to mangers and to other high-income workers, as higher marginal tax 
rates increase the incentives to structure compensation packages in a tax-advantaged 
fashion.  For example, under the income tax laws of both Japan and the U.S., fringe 
benefits and performance-based compensation can often be made tax favorable as 
compared to wage salaries, thus impacting the form of compensation paid to managers 
and workers, and thereby altering the incentive bargains reached between managers, 
employees, and monetary capital providers. 
 C. The Goal of Promoting Desirable Behavior  
 Beyond the goals of raising revenues while minimizing excess burden and 
promoting socially desirable redistribution, taxes are also used to influence taxpayer 
behavior.  By taxing activities that generate “negative externalities” (harms that affect 
parties external to the taxpayer), or by granting tax credits or deductions for activities 
that generate positive externalities (benefits that accrue to parties external to the 
taxpayer), governments can induce taxpayers to internalize the externalities so that the 
                                            
18 Id. 
19 Hiroshi Kaneko, The Japanese Income Tax System and the Disparity of Income and Wealth Among People in 
Japan, in Proceedings from the 2009 Sho Sato Conference, 3-4 (2009), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/sho_sato_tax_conf_web_paper--kaneko.pdf, accessed 10/1/2012 (noting that the 
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taxpayer’s decisions maximize social welfare rather than just the taxpayer’s own 
welfare.  Taxes designed to control externalities are sometimes called “Pigouvian 
taxes.”  A classic example are taxes imposed on pollution, which if set correctly can 
cause the taxpayers to pollute only to the extent that the social benefit of the activity 
causing the pollution exceeds the harm caused by the pollution.20 
Pigouvian taxes are less important with respect to enterprise law than are taxes 
designed to raise revenues and promote distribution policy.  Yet both corporate and 
individual income taxes are filled with tax incentives designed to promote behavior that 
governments deem socially beneficial.  These Pigouvian tax provisions can and do 
affect the incentive bargains of the business enterprise. 
D. The Goal of Enacting Fiscal Stimulus 
 The final tax policy goal that we will discuss is probably the least important for 
enterprise law.  Tax laws can play an important role in macroeconomic stabilization 
policy.  Ideally, tax systems should be structured so as to provide fiscal stimulus during 
temporary economic downturns and to take away that stimulus during upturns.  When 
government budgets do not need to be balanced in the short run, income taxes and 
especially corporate income taxes can provide stimulus, because these forms of 
taxation take far less revenue from the economy during economic downturns than 
during periods of strong economic growth.21  The manner in which tax laws are 
designed to promote fiscal stimulus can affect enterprise law by impacting the timing of 
investment decisions and the attractiveness of debt as opposed to equity financing, 
which can affect the incentive bargains between managers and monetary capital 
providers.  As both Japan and the U.S. have been facing sustained periods of stagnant 
economic growth, the fiscal stimulus policies these governments adopt may carry 
significant stakes for the incentive bargains negotiated between managers and 
monetary capital providers.  
 
III. Taxation and Enterprise Law’s Incentive Bargains 
Other chapters in this volume will analyze some of the specific ways in which 
taxation and other government activities affect enterprise law’s incentive bargains.  We 
aim in this chapter only to provide a brief overview of the goals of tax policy and how 
                                            
20 For further discussion in another context, see David Gamage, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for 
Corrective Taxes in Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283 (2004). 
 
21 See, e.g., David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. 
REV. 749, 787-88 (2010).  
 
these goals inevitably lead to taxation impacting enterprise law.  Our purpose is to 
assist readers interested in the design of enterprise law to understand the tax policy 
perspective so as to facilitate understanding between those interested in enterprise 
policy and those interested in tax policy.  Having outlined the goals of tax policy, we can 
now analyze how managers, employees, and monetary capital providers respond to 
taxation. 
However, as a preface, it is worth noting that while the laws governing 
enterprises and taxation are often similar in the U.S. and Japan,22 the goals of 
policymakers and other stakeholders often differ.  For instance, many Japanese 
companies still place relatively greater emphasis on promoting the long-term welfare of 
their employees.23  It is important to recognize and account for differences in legal 
cultures and context in considering the varied ways in which managers, employees, and 
monetary capital providers might respond to taxation.  
A. How Managers Respond to Taxation 
Individuals seek at least three rewards from their participation in the workplace: 
(a) monetary compensation, (b) non-monetary compensation such as fringe benefits, 
and (c) work-related power and prestige.  Managers seek these rewards just as much 
as do non-managerial workers.   
Within most income tax systems, monetary compensation is the mostly highly 
taxed, non-monetary fringe benefits often go only partially taxed or are not taxed at all, 
and work-related power and status are rarely taxed.24  The reason for this disparity is 
valuation problems and concerns related to administrability.  Tax agencies have no 
ready means for assessing the value of work-related power and status, and it is also 
prohibitively difficult to assess the value of many forms of fringe benefits.   
Predictably then, taxation biases managers toward seeking more untaxed fringe 
benefits and work-related power and prestige than they would in the absence of 
taxation.  The higher the tax rates, the larger the bias against monetary compensation 
and toward these alternative workplace rewards. 
                                            
22 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule 
of Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 3, 14-15 (1996) (explaining that U.S. corporate and securities law were imported into 
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24 See Calvin H. Johnson, An Employer-Level Proxy Tax On Fringe Benefits, 123 TAX NOTES 483, 483-486 (2009) 
(explaining some of the ways that fringe benefits are tax favored). 
Perhaps this bias plays out most powerfully in incentivizing managers to build 
empires through mergers and acquisitions and through investing earnings in 
questionable expansion projects rather than returning earnings to shareholders.  
Managers seek to build workplace empires partially for the rewards these empires offer 
in terms of work-related power and status.  Were the managers to forgo these power 
and status related rewards in order to focus exclusively on maximizing profits, at best 
the mangers would receive higher monetary compensation (which is subject to taxation) 
in place of the foregone power and status (which is not subject to taxation). 
This empire-building bias is only one of the ways in which taxation affects 
managers’ incentives.  As we noted earlier, taxation affects the forms of monetary 
compensation offered to managers and other employees, and this in itself can affect 
mangers incentives, particularly to the extent taxation biases compensation packages 
toward stock options and other incentive-based forms of compensation as opposed to 
guaranteed salaries.  Managers typically have significant power to negotiate 
compensation packages that are designed in a tax-favorable fashion.   
B. How Employees Respond to Taxation 
Employees have similar incentives to managers, although many (especially 
lower-income) employees may be relatively more motivated by the pursuit of monetary 
compensation and less by work-related power and prestige.  Yet employees often have 
far less ability to negotiate custom compensation packages than do mangers.   
It is far more difficult to design tax-favored compensation packages for 
employees who are not able to negotiate for custom-tailored forms of compensation.  
These employees will typically prefer to be compensated in the form of cash wages 
because receiving cash wages grants the employees flexibility in how to spend the 
wages.  Cash wages are almost always fully taxable; providing compensation in a tax-
favored form typically requires limiting employee’s flexibility in how to use the 
compensation.  Employees who are not in a position to custom negotiate a 
compensation package to design limitations that are not overly restrictive with respect to 
the employees’ goals will thus often prefer to have their compensation fully taxed in 
order to maintain the flexibility of cash wages. 
 The incentive bargains managers reach with employees are also influenced by 
tax provisions that are regulatory in nature – tax provisions designed to encourage or 
discourage certain behaviors, in a Pigouvian fashion.  In the U.S., for instance, 
beginning in 2014, employers may be subject to tax penalties for not providing their 
employees with affordable employer-sponsored health insurance.25  U.S. tax law also 
includes a number of tax provisions that may penalize employers who offer fringe 
benefits if the employer offers the fringe benefits in a proscribed fashion. 
C. How Monetary Capital Providers Respond to Taxation 
 Monetary capital providers are generally motivated by the desire to secure the 
highest possible returns to their investments.  To this end, monetary capital providers 
sometimes also desire control rights over the business enterprises they invest in.  The 
major influence of tax laws is to make certain forms of investments more tax-favorable 
than others, thus encouraging monetary capital providers to structure their investments 
in a tax-favorable fashion. 
 We have already noted that most developed country tax systems treat debt 
investments more tax-favorably than equity investments.26  This bias for debt financing 
both leads monetary capital providers to invest through debt instruments rather than 
equity investments and encourages monetary capital providers to develop hybrid 
financial instruments with the tax characteristics of debt but some of the economic 
characteristics of equity. 
 Beyond the bias for debt financing, international tax rules also have a strong 
influence on investor behavior.  It is often possible to make investments more tax 
favorable by structuring the investments as cross-border transactions.  The flaws in the 
international tax rules of the U.S. and other nations are legendary.27  The desire to 
minimize tax liabilities by exploiting gaps in the relevant international tax rules strongly 
influences the bargains reaches between managers and monetary capital providers. 
 
 
                                            
25 David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms 
are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs for Low and Moderate Income Workers, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming), at 20-
25, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2067138 (June 4, 2012). 
26 See de Mooij, supra note 14 and accompanying text.  See also Ilma Ghouse & Humera Sultana, Entrepreneur 
Activity and Statutory Tax Requirement: An Empirical Analysis for Pakistan, ECON. REV., Feb. 1, 2012, at 13.  
27 E.g., Robert J. Dilworth Tax Reform: International Tax Issues and Some Proposals, INT’L TAX J. 5 (2009) 
available at http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/taxreform.pdf; Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income – 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policy, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001); Hugh J. Ault, 
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GLOBAL ECONOMY 28 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990), available at 
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general principles is far from straightforward. The present system is the result of a long process of successive 
“loophole closing” efforts, as the tax policy makers have discovered one way after another in which taxpayers (or 
foreign governments) can organize their affairs to take advantage of the U.S. rules.”) 
IV. Conclusion 
 Although the goal of minimizing excess burden supports designing a 
comprehensive tax system that is neutral with respect the economic decisions affecting 
the business enterprise, it is impossible to achieve a completely neutral tax system in 
practice.  This is especially true in countries like the U.S. and Japan that rely on income 
taxes, as income is an inherently nebulous concept.  Taxpayers find it all too easy to 
play tax minimization games by restructuring transactions so as to alter the character, 
timing, or jurisdiction of the transaction with respect to tax laws.  
 To the extent the goal of promoting distribution policy leads governments to 
enact progressive income tax schedules, such as in the U.S. and Japan as well as in 
most other nations, the distortions created by non-comprehensive tax bases are 
multiplied.  And, even recognizing that it is not possible to design a fully comprehensive 
tax base, governments fall far short of what might theoretically be possible.  The goals 
of promoting desirable behavior and enacting fiscal stimulus often lead policymakers to 
enact tax preferences or penalties in order to achieve non-tax-policy-related ends.  
Furthermore, politicians frequently prioritize rewarding narrow interest groups over 
providing for the general welfare; real-world tax laws are thus rife with special provisions 
intended to reward narrow interest groups. 
 Tax laws thus create many biases that affect the behavior of managers, 
employees, and monetary capital providers.  Many volumes have been written 
analyzing subsets of these biases, and there is still considerably more to be said.  In 
this chapter, our goal has been only to provide a high-level overview of the tax policy 
perspective on the interactions between tax law and enterprise law, and to sketch a few 
examples of how the nature of tax law influences the incentive bargains reached 
between managers, employees, and monetary capital providers.  It is important for 
those interested in tax policy and those interested in enterprise policy to understand one 
another’s perspectives.  Only through communication and collaboration can we combat 
the ways in which tax laws create problems for enterprise law or use tax law as a tool 
for correcting biases in enterprise law.  
